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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Steven Kenneth Bowman appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession 
of methamphetamine, entered pursuant to his conditional guilty plea. On appeal, he 
challenges the district court's denial of his suppression motion. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The district court made the following factual findings in relation to this case: 
Sometime between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. on April 13, 2013, Brant 
Casey witnessed, in his words, "a domestic violence in the car in front of 
me." The female passenger smacked the male driver in the head, and 
then the male driver pushed her away by the neck. According to Mr. 
Casey, the two would "go in spurts." They would be driving and then, all 
of the sudden, "she would kind of explode again." Mr. Casey called 
dispatch and described the car swerving in the road. He provided the 
police with the make and model of the car. Mr. Casey pulled over when 
he saw Garden City Police Officer Domeny conduct a traffic stop on the 
car he (Casey) had been following. 
Officer Domeny testified that he was dispatched to a "rolling 
domestic" or a "domestic in progress." Officer Domeny understood the 
dispatch call to mean that there was "a domestic going on inside a vehicle 
and the car was moving." Dispatch advised caution on the call, but Officer 
Domeny testified that dispatch did not explain what the caution was for. 
Three Garden City officers responded: Officers [sic] O'Gorman, Officer 
Domeny, and K-9 handler Sergeant Walbey. 
Sergeant Walbey spoke with the reporting party, Mr. Casey, while 
Officers O'Gorman and Domeny approached the fighting couple. Officer 
Domeny asked the driver to step out of the car, informed him he was 
being detained, and placed the male driver in handcuffs. Officer Domeny 
told the driver that he (the driver) was not under arrest, but was being 
detained. Officer Domeny considered this an investigation into a domestic 
violence situation. Officer Domeny asked the driver for his name, read 
him his Miranda rights, and questioned him about the alleged violence. 
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The driver identified himself as Steven Bowman. Officer Domeny 
asked for consent to search for weapons, which Mr. Bowman gave. 
Officer Domeny patted the outside of Mr. Bowman's clothing but found no 
weapons. At this point, Officer Domeny returned to his patrol car and 
turned off the video recording device so he could speak with Officer 
O'Gorman. As they were talking, both officers observed a handcuffed Mr. 
Bowman reach around his body and dig into the front pocket of the jeans 
he was wearing. 
Officer O'Gorman was concerned Mr. Bowman could be reaching 
for a weapon or trying to get rid of evidence. Officer O'Gorman reached 
into Mr. Bowman's pocket and removed a clear small baggy of a 
substance that Officer Domeny testified was methamphetamine. Mr. 
Bowman was then arrested and placed in the back of Officer Domeny's 
patrol car. Meanwhile, Sergeant Walbey finished speaking with the 
reporting party and met with Officers Domeny and O'Gorman. 
Sergeant Walbey told the other officers what the calling party had 
said. It was at this point that Officer O'Gorman, who had detained the 
female passenger Ms. Phillips in the back of his patrol car, decided to 
arrest Ms. Phillips for domestic battery. 
Officers O'Gorman and Domeny told Sergeant Walbey that they 
found methamphetamine on Mr. Bowman. They collectively decided to 
use Bullet (Sgt. Walbey's dog) to sniff the car Mr. Bowman had been 
driving. The total time from Mr. Bowman pulling over to Bullet's sniff was 
not more than ten minutes and possibly as few as five minutes. It is 
important to note that, at the time Bullet was engaged in his assigned task, 
Officer O'Gorman was talking with Mr. Bowman. 
Bullet is certified to alert on methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, 
marijuana and paraphernalia associated with those drugs, which Bullet 
does by sitting down. Within seconds of being deployed Bullet sat down 
to alert on the front seats of the car Bowman had been driving. 
Officer Domeny investigated. He reached under the passenger 
seat where Bullet had alerted and noticed a suspicious cable. It was 
wrapped around the post where the seats were mounted to the floor of the 
vehicle. Officer Domeny tugged on the wire and found a small safe 
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connected to the wire. The officers could not find a key to the safe, so 
Officer Domeny pried it open with his hands. Inside the safe Officer 
Domeny found $400 in cash, a digital scale, and two baggies that he 
testified had methamphetamine inside. 
The officers also located a backpack on the passenger's side of the 
car, which they searched. It contained hypodermic needles. Ms. Phillips 
was arrested for possessing paraphernalia based upon the contents of the 
backpack. She was also arrested for domestic battery based upon the 
calling party's statements to dispatch. She was placed in the back of a 
patrol car with Mr. Bowman so they could both be taken to the Ada County 
Jail. 
(R., pp.125-28 (citations and footnotes omitted).) 
The state charged Bowman both with possession of methamphetamine and 
possession of paraphernalia, and also included an enhancement for being a persistent 
violator of the law. (R., pp.63-64, 110-12.) Bowman filed a motion to suppress the 
evidence, arguing that his arrest was unlawful and that officers lacked legal justification 
to search him. (R., pp.83-92.) Following a hearing on the motion (R., pp.122-23), the 
district court denied Bowman's suppression motion (R., pp.124-35). 
Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, whereby Bowman reserved the right to 
appeal the denial of his suppression motion, the state dismissed the persistent violator 
allegation and the possession of paraphernalia charge, and Bowman pleaded guilty to 
possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp.141-42.) The district court entered judgment 
against Bowman and sentenced him to a unified term of 15 years with two and a half 
years fixed. (R., pp.148-49.) Bowman filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.151-53.) 
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ISSUE 
Bowman states the issue on appeal as: 
Whether the district court erred by denying Mr. Bowman's motion to 
suppress the evidence found in the car. 
(Appellant's brief, p.7.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 




Bowman Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Denying His Motion To 
Suppress Evidence 
A. Introduction 
Following an alert from a drug dog, officers located methamphetamine and other 
evidence of drug possession in Bowman's vehicle. (R., p.127.) Bowman filed a motion 
to suppress the evidence, asserting that his rights were violated. (R., pp.83-92.) The 
district court denied Bowman's suppression motion. (R., pp.124-35.) Bowman now 
asserts that the district court erred by denying that motion. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-25.) 
He has failed, however, to show clear error in the district court's factual findings or error 
in its application of the correct legal standards to those findings. The district court's 
order denying Bowman's suppression motion should be affirmed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence and exercises 
free review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards have 
been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-86, 
211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the 
credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual 
inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 
P.2d 993, 997 (1995). 
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C. The District Court Correctly Denied Bowman's Suppression Motion 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
While routine traffic stops by police officers implicate the Fourth Amendment's 
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the reasonableness of a traffic 
stop is also analyzed under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), because a traffic stop is 
more similar to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest. Delaware v. Prouse, 
440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 
(Ct. App. 2003). "An investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon specific 
articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is 
about to be engaged in criminal activity." Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983, 88 P.3d at 1223 
(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981 )). 
An investigative detention must not only be justified at its beginning, but must 
also be conducted in a manner that is reasonably related in scope and duration to the 
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. Florida v. Royer, 460 
U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983); State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181, 90 P.3d 926,931 (Ct. App. 
2004). "The purpose of a stop is not permanently fixed, however, at the moment the 
stop is initiated, for during the course of the detention there may evolve suspicion of 
criminality different from that which initially prompted the stop." Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 
984, 88 P.3d at 1224. Routine traffic stops may turn up suspicious circumstances which 
could justify an officer asking questions unrelated to the stop. State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 
608, 613, 798 P.2d 453, 458 (Ct. App. 1990). "The officer's observations, general 
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inquiries, and events succeeding the stop may-and often do-give rise to legitimate 
reasons for particular lines of inquiry and further investigation by an officer." kl 
Warrantless searches are also "per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). One such exception to 
the warrant requirement is the "automobile exception," which allows warrantless 
searches of vehicles when there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains 
contraband or evidence of criminal activity. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 
572 (1991); State v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 842, 979 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1999). 
"Probable cause is established if the facts available to the officer at the time of the 
search would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the area or items 
to be searched contained contraband or evidence of a crime." State v. Yeoumans, 144 
Idaho 871, 873, 172 P.3d 1146, 1148 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing United States v. Ross, 456 
U.S. 798, 823 (1982)). 
A drug-detection dog's sniff of the outside of an automobile need not be justified 
by suspicion of drug activity because it is not a "search" that implicates a privacy 
interest. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005); State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 
436, 442, 34 P.3d 1119, 1125 (Ct. App. 2001). However, "[w]hen a reliable drug-
detection dog indicates that a lawfully stopped automobile contains the odor of 
controlled substances, the officer has probable cause to believe that there are drugs in 
the automobile and may search it without a warrant." Yeoumans, 144 Idaho at 873, 172 
P.3d at 1148 (quoting State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 227, 281, 108 P.3d 424, 428 (Ct. App. 
2005)). "If probable cause justifies the search of a vehicle, then it justifies the search of 
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every part of the vehicle and its contents which could conceal the object of the search." 
State v. Braendle, 134 Idaho 173, 175, 997 P .2d 634, 636 (Ct. App. 2000). 
Applying these correct legal standards, the district court held that the search of 
Bowman's car was justified under the automobile exception, because probable cause 
was established when the drug dog alerted during its open air sniff of the vehicle, and 
the officers did not delay the traffic stop in order to deploy the drug dog. (R., pp.124-
35.) The state adopts as part of its argument on appeal Part V of the court's analysis, 
located at pages 132-34 of its "Order on Co-Defendants' Motion to Suppress," a copy of 
which is attached as "Appendix A." 
On appeal, Bowman disputes both the district court's legal analysis and factual 
findings regarding whether the traffic stop was delayed for the arrival of the drug dog. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.9-17.) Bowman argues that, under Idaho precedent, "it is 
unreasonable for officers to stall or draw out their investigative efforts to allow a drug 
dog to arrive and sniff the vehicle." (Appellant's brief, pp.14-15; see also State v. 
Martinez, 136 Idaho 436, 442 n.2, 34 P.3d 1119, 1125 n.2 (Ct. App. 2001 ).) While 
Bowman's statement of the law is unobjectionable, his application of that law to the 
facts of this case is wholly misguided. In this case, as found by the district court and 
apparently unchallenged on appeal, the officers had no need to "draw out their 
investigative efforts" to allow a drug dog to arrive; the drug dog was on scene at the 
inception of the investigation. (R., p.133.) 
There is equally no evidence that the officers "dr[e]w out their investigative 
efforts" to allow the drug dog to perform an open air sniff outside of Bowman's vehicle. 
The district court specifically found that the drug dog's sniff was contemporaneous with 
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Officer O'Gorman's speaking with Bowman, which the court found was necessary to 
conclude the domestic violence investigation. (R., p.133.) Bowman challenges this 
factual finding, but he cannot show clear error. A district court's findings are clearly 
erroneous only where they are unsupported by substantial evidence. See State v. 
Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170, 139 P.3d 771, 772 (Ct. App. 2006). The district court's 
factual finding is directly supported by the testimony of Sergeant Walbey that he thought 
Officer O'Gorman was talking with Bowman while the drug dog performed the open air 
sniff. (9/18/2013 Tr., p.87, Ls.11-14.) That is substantial evidence. 
Bowman alleges that there is conflicting testimonial evidence in the record. (See 
Appellant's brief, pp.12-13.) But substantial evidence can exist even when there is 
conflicting evidence in the record. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 649, 712, 215 P.3d 
414, 432 (2009). And, as noted above, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, 
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the 
trial court at a suppression hearing. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho at 106, 897 P.2d at 997. 
Because the district court's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence they 
should be upheld, even in the face of Bowman's allegedly conflicting evidence. 
Bowman further asserts that any contact between Officer O'Gorman and 
Bowman could not possibly relate to the domestic violence investigation and so would 
necessarily be an unauthorized extension of the traffic stop. (Appellant's brief, pp.13-
14; see also n.9.) But even recognizing that contacting Bowman would not be required 
to acquire additional evidence relating to the domestic battery, Bowman's argument still 
ignores the salient and undisputed fact that he was handcuffed. (R., p.126.) If only to 
remove the handcuffs, explain the officers' resolution of the domestic violence case, and 
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release Bowman from detention, officers would be required to contact him to conclude 
their investigation. And that contact did not have to take long; as found by the district 
court, the drug dog alerted within seconds of being deployed. (R., p.127.) Contacting 
Bowman to conclude the investigation, therefore, would not unlawfully extend the 
duration of the traffic stop and Bowman has failed to show error in the district court's 
legal analysis. 
D. Officers' Terry Search Of Bowman Was Also Justified 
Even if officers had delayed the conclusion of the investigation to wait for a drug 
dog to arrive on scene-a theory contradicted by the evidence in this case-such action 
would be legally justified in this case because officers had discovered evidence of drugs 
during their investigation. During the course of the investigation officers observed as 
Bowman, though handcuffed, attempted to retrieve something from his pocket. (R., 
p.126.) Officers emptied the pocket Bowman was trying to access, discovering a 
baggie of methamphetamine. (Id.) The district court erroneously held that this search 
was not justified by the Terry exception to the warrant requirement. (R., pp.129-30.) 
Because the state is not seeking affirmative relief different from what was granted by 
the district court below, it may challenge this holding without filing a cross appeal. I.A.R. 
15(a); Leer v. State, 148 Idaho 112, 114, 218 P.3d 1173, 1175 (2009). 
The right of persons to be free from government intrusions "must be shaped by 
the context in which it is asserted. For 'what the Constitution forbids is not all searches 
and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures."' Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 (quoting 
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)). "The purpose of [a Terry search] is 
not to discover evidence of a crime, but to allow the Officer to pursue his investigation 
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without fear of violence." Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972). To justify a 
Terry search, there must be a reasonable basis for suspecting that the individual being 
searched poses a risk of danger. State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 660-61, 152 P.3d 
16, 21-22 (2007). This "is evaluated in light of the facts known to the officers on the 
scene and the inference of the risk of danger reasonably drawn from the totality of the 
circumstances." State v. Wright, 134 Idaho 79, 82, 996 P.2d 298, 301 (2000) (internal 
quotation omitted). The test is an objective one and is not dependant on the subjective 
beliefs of an individual officer. Willoughby, 147 Idaho at 489, 211 P.3d at 98 (citation 
omitted). 
The totality of the circumstances in this case creates objectively reasonable 
suspicion to believe that Bowman could present a risk of danger to the officers and 
others. Dispatch advised the officers to use caution when dealing with the call, but did 
not explain what the caution was for. (R., p.125.) Then, while being investigated for a 
violent crime, and though handcuffed, Bowman tried to get something out of his pocket. 
Under those circumstances, it is objectively reasonable to believe that Bowman had 
something in his pocket. It is equally reasonable to believe that he might attempt to use 
whatever he had in his pocket to injure another or, more likely, to pick his lock and 
escape. Especially where Bowman was being investigated for a violent crime where the 
officers were advised to use caution, it is reasonable for an officer to believe that an 
unrestrained Bowman would pose a risk of danger. Therefore, to protect themselves 
and others nearby, officers were justified under Terry in removing whatever Bowman 
was attempting to retrieve from his pocket. 
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In determining the validity of a Terry search, the question for reviewing courts is 
an objective one: "Would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure 
or search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was 
appropriate?" Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 
(1925); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96-97 (1964)). Considering the facts available to 
officers at the moment they emptied Bowman's pocket, especially the fact that they 
were investigating him for a violent crime, the action they took was appropriate. The 
district court therefore erred in concluding that emptying Bowman's pocket was not 
justified under Terry, and assuming, arguendo, that officers had delayed Bowman's 
detention to wait for a drug dog to arrive, they would have been justified in doing so 
under the circumstances of this case. Bowman has failed to show error in the denial of 
his suppression motion. The district court's order should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
denying Bowman's motion to suppress evidence. 
DATED this 30th day of January, 2015. 
CR~~R 
Deputy Attorney General 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVEN KENNETH BOWMAN, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CRFE-2013-4994 
ORDER ON CO-DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
I. Procedural Background 
On August 15, 2013, Steven Bowman filed a motion to suppress "all evidence 
obtained as a result of an illegal arrest and subsequent search of both the defendant's . 
person and a locked container within his vehicle .... " (Defs Mot. to Suppress at 1). 
His co-defendant Angela Phillips joined that motion on August 27, 2013. The State filed 
its objection on September 16, 2013. 
A suppression hearing was held on September 18, 2013. The State called four 
witnesses: (1) Brant Casey (who called dispatch when he saw two individuals fighting 
inside a car); (2) Garden City Police Officer Domeny (who performed t,he traffic stop on 
the car and talked to the driver, Defendant Bowman): (3) Garden City Police Officer 
O'Gorman (who spoke with the car's passenger, Defendant Phillips, and searched 
Defendant Bowman's pants' pocket) and (4) Garden City Sergeant Walbey (a K-9 
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handler who spoke with the reporting party). The Court also received and considered 
State's Exhibit 1, which contained two video clips taken from Officer Domeny's patrol 
vehicle. Neither defendant called any witnesses. 
The Court took the matter under advisement and now issues this written 
decision. 
II. Factual Findings 
Sometime between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. on April 13, 2013, Brant Casey 
witnessed, in his words, "a domestic violence in the car in front of me." (Draft Tr. at 5).1 
The female passenger smacked the male driver in the head, and then the male driver 
pushed her away by the neck. According to Mr. Casey, the two would "go in spurts." 
(Id. at 7). They would be driving and then, all of the sudden, "she would kind of explode 
again." (Id.) Mr. Casey called dispatch and described the car swerving in the road. He 
provided the police with the make and model of the car. Mr. Casey pulled over when he 
saw Garden City Police Officer Domeny conduct a traffic stop on the car he (Casey) had 
been following. 
Officer Domeny testified that he was dispatched to a "rolling domestic" or a 
"domestic in progress." (Draft Tr. at 15). Officer Domeny understood the dispatch call 
to mean that there was "a domestic going on inside a vehicle and the car was moving." 
(Id. at 15). Dispatch advised caution on the call, but Officer Domeny testified that 
dispatch did not explain what the caution was for. Three Garden City officers 
responded: Officers O'Gorman, Officer Domeny, and K-9 handler Sergeant Walbey. 
1 The official transcript of the suppression hearing is not available; therefore, all citations 
are taken from a draft transcript. 
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Sergeant Walbey spoke with the reporting party, Mr. Casey, while Officers 
O'Gorman and Domeny approached the fighting couple. Officer Domeny asked the 
driver to step out of the car, informed him he was being detained, and placed the male 
driver in handcuffs. Officer Domeny told the driver that he (the driver) was not under 
arrest, but was being detained. Officer Domeny considered this an investigation into a 
domestic violence situation. (Id. at 43). Officer Domeny asked the driver for his name, 
read him his Miranda2 rights, and questioned him about the alleged violence. 
The driver identified himself as Steven Bowman. Officer Domeny asked for 
consent to search for weapons, which Mr. Bowman gave. Officer Domeny patted the 
outside of Mr. Bowman's clothing but found no weapons. At this point, Officer Domeny 
returned to his patrol car and turned off the video recording device so he could speak 
with Officer O'Gorman. As they were talking, both officers observed a handcuffed Mr. 
Bowman reach around his body and dig into the front pocket of the jeans he was 
wearing. 
Officer O'Gorman was concerned Mr. Bowman could be reaching for a weapon 
or trying to get rid of evidence. Officer O'Gorman reached into Mr. Bowman's pocket 
and removed a clear small baggy of a substance that Officer Domeny testified was 
methamphetamine. Mr. Bowman was then arrested3 and placed in the back of Officer 
Domeny's patrol car. Meanwhile, Sergeant Walbey finished speaking with the reporting 
party and met with Officers Domeny and O'Gorman. 
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
3 There was no testimony regarding the reason for the arrest; therefore, the Court 
makes no factual finding on this point. As a mixed question of fact and law, the Court 
finds that - prior to Mr. Bowman's formal arrest - no "de facto" arrest occurred. 
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Sergeant Walbey told the other officers what the calling party had said. It was at 
this point that Officer O'Gorman, who had detained the female passenger Ms. Phillips in 
the back of his patrol car, decided to arrest Ms. Phillips for domestic battery. 
Officers O'Gorman and Domeny told Sergeant Walbey that they found 
methamphetamine on Mr. Bowman. They collectively decided to use Bullet (Sgt. 
Walbey's dog) to sniff the car Mr. Bowman had been driving. The total time from Mr. 
Bowman pulling over to Bullet's sniff was not more than ten minutes and possibly as few 
as five minutes. It is important to note that, at the time Bullet was engaged in his 
assigned task, Officer O'Gorman was talking with Mr. Bowman. 
Bullet is certified to alert on methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, marijuana and 
paraphernalia associated with those drugs, which Bullet does by sitting down. Within 
seconds of being deployed Bullet sat down to alert on the front seats of the car Bowman 
had been driving. 
Officer Domeny investigated. He reached under the passenger seat where Bullet 
had alerted and noticed a suspicious cable. It was wrapped around the post where the 
seats were mounted to the floor of the vehicle. Officer Domeny tugged on the wire and 
found a small safe connected to the wire. The officers could not find a key to the safe, 
so Officer Domeny pried it open with his hands. Inside the safe Officer Domeny found 
$400 in cash, a digital scale, and two baggies that he testifiep had methamphetamine 
inside. 
The officers also located a backpack on the passenger's side of the car, which 
they searched. It contained hypodermic needles. Ms. Phillips was arrested for 
possessing paraphernalia based upon the contents of the backpack. She was also 
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arrested for domestic battery based upon the calling party's statements to dispatch. 
She was placed in the back of a patrol car with Mr. Bowman so they could both be 
taken to the Ada County Jail. 
Ill. Summary 
Mr. Bowman claims the officers violated his state and federal right4 to be free 
from unreasonable search and seizure by (1) unlawfully searching his pants' pocket 
without a warrant and (2) extending the traffic stop beyond its initial purpose to deploy a 
drug sniffing dog. Ms. Phillips joins in both of these arguments.5 
As set forth below, the Court concludes that (1) no exception to the warrant 
requirement applies to the search of Mr. Bowman's pocket; therefore, the evidence from 
his pocket will be suppressed and (2) the search of the vehicle Mr. Bowman was driving 
was lawful under the automobile exception and all evidence found during that search is 
admissible. 
IV. The Search of Mr. Bowman's Pocket Was Unlawful Because No 
Exception to the Warrant Requirement Applies 
Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable. U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
State v. Anderson, 140 Idaho 484, 486, 95 P.3d 635, 637 (2004). The burden of proof 
is on the State to show that a warrantless search fell within one of the well-recognized 
4 Mr. Bowman does not argue that Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution 
provides any greater protection than the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. 
Therefore, the Court applies Federal Fourth Amendment law in its analysis. 
5 As a matter of law, Ms. Phillips may not challenge the search of Mr. Bowman's 
pocket or the car; she may only challenge the search of her backpack. See State v. 
Ryan, 117 Idaho 504, 506-07, 788 P.2d 1327, 1329-30 (1990) (to have standing to 
challenge a search, an individual must demonstrate some proprietary interest in the 
premises searched or some other reasonable expectation of privacy). 
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exceptions to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the 
circumstances. State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 485, 163 P .3d 1194, 1197 (2007). 
A. The Consent Exception to the Warrant Requirement Does Not Apply 
The State argues that two exceptions apply in this case: (1) consent and (2) 
probable cause. State's Brief in Support of Objection to Def.'s Mot. to Suppress at 5. 
Consent is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Smith, 144 Idaho at 
488, 163 P.3d at 1200. However, on the facts of this case, consent does not apply. 
Defendant Bowman gave Officer Domeny consent to pat him down for weapons, 
which Officer Domeny did. Defendant Bowman did not give Officer O'Gorman consent 
to reach into his pocket at any point. Cf. State v. Tyler, 153 Idaho 623, 628-29, 299 
P.3d 840, 845-46 (Ct. App. 2012) (scope of the search, whether viewed as a search 
based on consent or Teny, was limited to a pat-down of Tyler's outer clothing). 
Because Defendant Bowman did not consent to the search performed, the consent 
exception does not apply. 
The second exception argued by the State - probable cause - is not an exception 
to the warrant requirement. Indeed, probable cause is the standard of proof required to 
obtain a warrant in the first place. See State v. Crabb, 107 Idaho 298, 302, 688 P .2d 
1203, 1207 (Ct. App. 1984). Because probable cause is not an exception to the warrant 
requirement, the Court does not address this argument. 
B. The Stop-And-Frisk Exception to the Warrant Requirement Does Not 
Apply 
In Teny v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968), the United States Supreme Court created 
a stop-and-frisk exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. Teny 
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sometimes permits intrusions beyond a pat-down of an individual's outer clothing; 
., 
however, the State bears the burden of demonstrating that the additional intrusion was 
warranted. Tyler, 153 Idaho at 627-28, 288 P.3d at 844-45. 
A search for weapons must, "like any other search, be strictly circumscribed by 
the exigencies which justify its initiation." Terry, 392 U.S. at 25-26. An officer may frisk 
an individual for weapons when the officer has reason to believe the individual is "armed 
and presently dangerous to the officer or to others" and nothing in the i~itial stages of 
the encounter dispels the officer's belief. Id. at 24. The objective test asks whether, 
under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonably prudent person would be justified 
in concluding that the individual posed a risk of danger. State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 
655, 660--61, 152 P.3d 16, 21-22 (2007). Under Henage, for the stop-and-frisk 
exception to apply, it is not sufficient for an officer to believe that an individual is armed, 
the officer must also reasonably believe that the individual is dangerous. 
No one testified that Defendant Bowman was dangerous or posed a threat. 
Officer Domeny testified that Bowman was cooperative. (Draft Tr. at 38). And although 
Officer Domeny testified that people can change on you quite quickly, he conceded that, 
he had no indication that Bowman posed a threat. (Draft Tr. at 38). Mr. Bowman made 
a furtive hand movement toward his right pocket while sitting on the patrol car; however, 
Officer Domeny and Officer O'Gorman both testified that they believed the hand 
movement could indicate either the presence of a weapon or an attempt to destroy 
evidence. Because no evidence was presented that Mr. Bowman was armed and 
presently dangerous to the officers or others, the search of Mr. Bowman's pocket was 
not justified under the stop-and-frisk exception. 
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C. Based Upon the Evidence Presented at the Suppression Hearing, the 
Court Cannot Conclude that the Exigency Exception Applies 
The exigent circumstances exception allows warrantless searches to prevent the 
imminent destruction of evidence and prevent harm to persons. See State v. Smith, 
120 Idaho 77, 82, 813 P.2d 888, 893 (1991). "In determining whether the officers 
reasonably feared imminent destruction of evidence, the appropriate inquiry is whether 
the facts, as they appeared at the precise moment in question, would lead a 
reasonable, experienced officer to believe that evidence might be destroyed before a 
warrant could be secured." State v. Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 504, 975 P.2d 789, 792 
(1999). 
Both officers Domeny and O'Gorman testified that - in addition to their concerns 
about weapons - they were concerned Bowman could be trying to destroy evidence 
when he reached inside his pocket. However, neither officer testified what type of 
evidence they believed might be in the Defendant's pocket (drugs?), why they believed 
the Defendant might have evidence in his pocket, or why such evidence might be 
destroyed before a warrant could be secured. It may be that the exigency exception 
applies; however, the burden is on the State to demonstrate the applicability of the 
exception. State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 92, 625 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1981). This 
burden has not been met; therefore, the Court cannot find that the exigency exception 
applies to the search of Defendant Bowman's pocket. 
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V. The Search of the Vehicle Was Lawful 
A. The Defendant Has Not Met His Burden for the Court to Apply the Fruit 
of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine 
Mr. Bowman contends that, because the search of his pocket was unlawful, 
evidence discovered during the search of the vehicle Mr. Bowman was driving should 
be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. However, evidence will not be excluded 
as poisonous fruit unless the illegality is the "but for'' cause of the discovery. State v. 
McBain<:, 144 Idaho 130, 133-34, 157 P.3d 1101, 1104-05 (Ct. App. 2007). 
While the State bears the ultimate burden of proving that the challenged 
evidence is untainted, the initial burden is on the Defendant to show a factual nexus 
between the illegality and the State's acquisition of evidence. Alderman v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 165, 183 (1969). Here, the burden is on the Defendant to show the 
factual nexus between the search of Bowman's pocket and the search of the car. The 
Defendant has not met that burden. In this case, the "but for" cause of the discovery 
was Bullet's lawful nose, not Officer O'Gorman's unlawful search. Certainly the 
Defendant may argue that the police would not have deployed Bullet but for the 
discovery of the claimed methamphetamine in Mr. Bowman's pocket, but no evidence 
from the suppression hearing supports this claim. 
B. There Is No Evidence that the Stop Was Unlawfully Extended to Call for 
a Drug Dog 
A drug dog sniff is not a search, and may be performed during a traffic stop 
without violating the Fourth Amendment. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005). 
The Fourth Amendment may be implicated, however, when the traffic stop is delayed 
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solely to wait for the arrival of a drug dog. See State v. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886, 891, 
187 P.3d 1261, 1266 (Ct. App. 2008) (use of drug dog during traffic stop did not 
constitute unlawful extension of traffic stop when officer did not purposefully delay the 
process to wait for the arrival of the drug dog); Cf. State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 
363, 17 P.3d 301, 307 (Ct. App. 2000) (running a dog around the perimeter of the 
vehicle while a second officer was writing and issuing citations did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment). Therefore, the Court's consideration "turns on whether there was any 
delay or lengthening of the stop." Ramirez, 145 Idaho at 890, 187 P.3d at 1265. 
The total time from Mr. Bowman pulling over to Bullet's sniff was not more. than 
ten minutes and possibly as few as five minutes. Sergeant Walbey also testified that, at 
the time Bullet was engaged in his assigned task, Officer O'Gorman was talking with Mr. 
Bowman. Thus, there is evidence to suggest that the time used by the officers was 
necessary to complete the investigation into the alleged domestic battery. There is no 
evidence indicating the officers purposefully delayed the initial investigation to bring 
Bullet on scene. Bullet was on scene from the beginning of the call and there was no 
delay in running him around the car. Accordingly, the use of Bullet during the lawful 
duration of the traffic stop did not constitute an unlawful extension of that stop. 
C. After Bullet's Alert, the Vehicle Search Was Lawful Under the 
Automobile Exception 
The search of the car was justified in this case under the automobile exception to 
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the warrant requirement.6 Under the automobile exception, police may search a vehicle 
if there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity. 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 (1982) (cited in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 
332, 347 (2009)); State v. Braendle, 134 Idaho 173, 175, 997 P.2d 634, 636 (Ct. App. 
2000). The automobile exception permits police to search any area of the vehicle in 
which the evidence may be found, including closed containers. Braen.dle, 134 Idaho at 
175, 997 P.2d at 636 ("If probable cause justifies the search of a vehicle, then it justifies 
the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents which could conceal the object of 
the search."): 
Because Bullet is a certified drug dog, his alert gave police officers probable 
cause to search the car. State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 283, 108 P.3d 424, 430 (Ct. 
App. 2005). Accordingly, the officers' search of the vehicle, including the search of the 
locked safe and Mr. Phillips' backpack, was lawful. 
6 The State argues that the search of the vehicle was justified as a search incident to 
arrest under Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009). As stated in footnote 3, there 
was no testimony regarding the reason for Mr. Bowman's arrest. Assuming that the 
basis for the arrest was possession of methamphetamine, the arrest was not lawful; 
therefore, the Court does not address the search incident to arrest exception. 
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